Age and the Eighth Amendment

In my last
blog, I mentioned that the Supreme Court would be hearing two cases to
determine if life sentences without parole for juveniles constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.

Yesterday,
the Court heard arguments for both cases.

The first
case, Sullivan v. Florida, was for a man who was 13 when he was sentenced to life without possibility
of parole. His lawyer is asking the court to say such a sentence for an
individual under the age of 14 is cruel and unusual punishment.

In the
second case, Graham v. Florida, it was argued that a life sentence should be set at 18 for crimes
that did not involve a killing. The case
involved Terrance Graham, a juvenile sentencied to life for armed burglary at a
probation violation at 17.

The New
York Times reported that most of the Justices seemed receptive to the idea of
accounting for age when the sentence of life without possibility of parole is
issued, “but there was disagreement among the justices about where to draw
various lines and, indeed, over whether line-drawing or case-by-case
determination was the right approach.”

The most
concerning exchange of words for me in yesterday’s argument was the following,
as reported by the Times:

“Justice
Stephen G. Breyer said the words of the Eighth Amendment might justify
categorical distinctions, at least for the youngest offenders. “It’s pretty
unusual to have this,” he said. And, at least for 13-year-olds, he continued,
“it is a cruel thing to do to remove from that individual his entire
life.”

Scott D. Makar,
Florida’s solicitor general, said that was the wrong
analysis.

“It’s a lawful
sentence that can be imposed, but it’s rare,” he said. “And we should be proud
of that.”

Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito appeared to agree that the rarity of the sentences
suggests that the criminal justice system is making discerning rather than
arbitrary judgments in reserving the punishment for extreme
cases.”

With the exception of the
right to vote, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights applies to all citizens,
regardless of their age. I am not convinced the rarity of the sentence is
something to be proud of if the sentence is still imposed on the youngest of
juvenile defendants. Let’s hope that Breyer’s point that “the Eight Amendment
might justify categorical distinctions, at least for the youngest offenders”
prevails as the Supreme Court continues to hear arguments and make its decision
on the constitutionality of the sentences.